

modum reperias ab uno affirmari, quod alter statim non impii in esse clamat." (Th. Bez. *Epist. ad Andream Dudit.*)

Grotius, one of the most learned of Protestants, also felt the weakness of the foundation on which the separated sects repose. Many people have believed that he died a Catholic. The Protestants accused him of having the intention of embracing the Roman faith; and the Catholics, who had relations with him at Paris, thought the same thing. It is said that the celebrated Petau, the friend of Grotius, at the news of his death, said mass for him; an anecdote the truth of which I do not guarantee. It is certain that Grotius, in his work entitled *De Antichristo*, does not think, with other Protestants, that the Pope is Antichrist. It is certain that, in his work entitled *Votum pro Pace Ecclesie*, he says, without circumlocution, "that without the supremacy of the Pope, it is impossible to put an end to disputes;" and he alleges the example of the Protestants: "as it happens," says he, "among the Protestants." It is certain that, in his posthumous work, *Rivetiani Apologetici Discussio*, he openly lays down the fundamental principle of Catholicity, namely, that "the dogmas of faith should be decided by tradition and the authority of the Church, and not by the holy Scriptures only."

The conversion of the celebrated Protestant Papin, which made so much noise, is another proof of what we are endeavoring to show. Papin reflected on the fundamental principle of Protestantism, and on the contradiction which exists between this principle and the intolerance of Protestants, who, relying only on private judgment, yet have recourse to authority for self-preservation. He reasoned as follows: "If the principle of authority, which they attempt to adopt, is innocent and legitimate, it condemns their origin, wherein they refused to submit to the authority of the Catholic Church; but if the principle of private judgment, which they embraced in the beginning, was right and just, this is enough to condemn the principle of authority invented by them for the purpose of avoiding its excesses; for this principle opens and smooths the way to the greatest disorders of impiety."

Puffendorf, who will certainly not be accused of coldness when attacking Catholicity, could not help paying his tribute also to the truth, when, in a confession for which all Catholics ought to thank him, he says, "The suppression of the authority of the Pope has sowed endless germs of discord in the world: as there is no longer any sovereign authority to terminate the disputes which arise on all sides, we have seen the Protestants split among themselves, and tear their bowels with their own hands." (Puffendorf, *de Monarch. Pont. Roman.*)

Leibnitz, that great man, who, according to the expression of Fontenelle, advanced all sciences, also acknowledged the weakness of Protestantism, and the organizing power which belongs to the Catholic Church. We know that, far from participating in the anger of Protestants against the Pope, he regarded the religious supremacy of Rome with the most lively sympathy. He openly avows the superiority of the Catholic over the Protestant mis-

sions; the religious communities themselves, the objects of so much aversion to so many people, were to him highly respectable. These anticipations with respect to the religious ideas of this great man have been more and more confirmed by one of his posthumous works, published for the first time at Paris in 1819. *The Exposition of the Doctrine of Leibnitz on Religion, followed by Thoughts extracted from the writings of the same Author, by M. Emera, formerly General Superior of St. Sulpice*, contains the posthumous work of Leibnitz, whereof the title, in the original manuscript, is, *Theological System*. The commencement of this work, remarkable for its seriousness and simplicity, is certainly worthy of the great soul of this distinguished thinker. It is this: "After having long and profoundly studied religious controversies, after having implored the divine assistance, and laid aside, as far as it is possible for man, all spirit of party, I have considered myself as a neophyte come from the new world, and one who had not yet embraced an opinion; behold, therefore, the conclusions at which I have arrived, and what appeared to me, out of all that I have examined, worthy to be received by all unprejudiced men, as what is most conformable to the holy Scriptures and respectable antiquity; I will even say, to right reason and the most certain historical facts."

Leibnitz afterwards lays down the existence of God, the Incarnation, the Trinity, and the other dogmas of Christianity; he adopts with candor, and defends with much learning, the doctrine of the Catholic Church on tradition, the sacraments, the sacrifice of the Mass, the respect paid to relics and holy images, the Church hierarchy, and the supremacy of the Pope. He adds, "In all cases which do not admit the delay of the convocation of a general Council, or which do not deserve to be considered therein, it must be admitted that the first of the Bishops, or the Sovereign Pontiff, has the same power as the whole Church."

NOTE 8, p. 49.

Some persons may suppose that what we have said with respect to the emptiness of human knowledge and the weakness of our intellect, has been said only for the purpose of making the necessity of a rule in matters of faith more sensibly felt. It is not so. It would be easy for me to insert here a long list of texts, drawn from the writings of the most illustrious men of ancient and modern times, who have insisted upon this very point. I will only quote here an excellent passage from an illustrious Spaniard, one of the greatest men of the sixteenth century, Louis Vives. "*Jam mens ipsa, suprema animi et celsissima pars, videbit quantopere sit tum natura sua tarda ac præpedita, tum tenebris peccati cæca, et a doctrina, usu, ac solertia imperita et rudis, ut ne ea quidem quæ videt, quæque manibus contractat, cujusmodi sint, aut quid fiant assequatur, ac lum ut in abdito illa natura arcana possit penetrare; sapienterque ab Aristotele illa est posita sententia: Mentem nostram ad manifestissimam naturam non aliter habere se, quam noctuæ oculum ad tamen solis. Ea omnia, quæ universum homi-*